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THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DEFENSE IN 
PATENT LITIGATION: WHERE WE ARE, WHERE 
WE HAVE BEEN, AND WHERE WE SHOULD GO 
FROM HERE 
Brett Ira Johnson† 
Abstract 
This paper examines the current status of the inequitable 
conduct defense in patent litigation, the historical evolution of the 
inequitable conduct defense in patent litigation, and problems and 
concerns with the administration of the inequitable conduct defense. 
This paper then reviews patent reform legislation and the various 
ways in which each would address the issue of inequitable conduct 
and opines on the desirability of the different proposals. Finally, this 
paper concludes that the inequitable conduct defense should be 
eliminated. 
In the alternative to the inequitable conduct defense, section 282 
of the Patent Act, should be interpreted to presume validity of an 
issued patent only when all non-cumulative material information was 
considered during examination. This change would serve the purpose 
for which inequitable conduct was created: to encourage full 
disclosure of all material information to the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, while eliminating the problems and resources 
expended with the assertion of the inequitable conduct defense during 
patent litigation. 
                                                                                                                            
 †  Brett Ira Johnson practices law in the area of complex litigation. Mr. Johnson 
graduated with his J.D., summa cum laude, from the University of Idaho College of Law in 2001 
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property, from New York University College of Law in 2010. Mr. Johnson is licensed to 
practice in Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Mr. 
Johnson would like to extend his gratitude to Dr. Michael VanAuker, Teri Karobonik, Darryl 
Ong, Chris Dombkowski, and the entire Santa Clara Computer and High Technology Law 
Journal for their invaluable edits and insight. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Inequitable conduct is a judicially created equitable doctrine that 
was intended to provide incentive to patentees to fully disclose 
material information to the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) 
during prosecution of patent applications.
1
 Under the doctrine, patent 
claims could be rendered unenforceable in subsequent litigation if a 
patentee failed to disclose material information.
2
 To prove inequitable 
conduct, the challenging party must show that the patentee: (1) made 
an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact or submitted false 
material information; and (2) intended to deceive the PTO.
3
 A 
showing of inequitable conduct renders all of the claims of a patent 
and potentially all claims of related applications unenforceable.
4
 
The expansion of the inequitable conduct doctrine has caused 
concern among patent experts
5
 and among judges on the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals.
6
 
[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major 
patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers 
seem to feel compelled to make the charge against other reputable 
lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client’s 
                                                                                                                            
 1. See Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
 2. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349, 1350, 
1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 3. See, e.g., Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (citing Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 4. See Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“[I]nequitable conduct with respect to one or more patents in a family can infect related 
applications, . . . .”) (citing Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 
(Fed. Cir. 1990);  
When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation 
to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire 
patent is rendered unenforceable. We, in banc, reaffirm that rule as set forth in 
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985).  
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989) (parallel citations omitted); See also Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 
1313. 
 5. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 123 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10976.html. 
 6. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1289 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). 
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interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere with the 
accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but such charges 
are not inconsequential on that account. They destroy the respect 
for one another’s integrity, for being fellow members of an 
honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable help to 
the courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to 
sustain the good name of the bar itself.
7
 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit remarked that “[t]he need to strictly 
enforce the burden of proof and elevated standard of proof in the 
inequitable conduct context is paramount because the penalty for 
inequitable conduct is so severe, the loss of the entire patent even 
where every claim clearly meets every requirement of patentability.”8 
The Court observed that “[t]his penalty was originally applied only in 
cases of ‘fraud on the Patent Office.’”9 However, “[s]ubsequent case 
law has broadened the doctrine to encompass misconduct less 
egregious than fraud but the severity of the penalty has not changed, 
and thus courts must be vigilant in not permitting the defense to be 
applied too lightly.”10 
The second element of inequitable conduct, intent to deceive, 
also raises concerns.
11
 Being a subjective inquiry, it is generally 
difficult to know the actual intent of the relevant individual and cases 
most often rely on circumstantial evidence to prove intent.
12
 Other 
concerns about application of the inequitable conduct doctrine 
include: increasing the costs of litigation, prejudicing the patentee,
13
 
                                                                                                                            
 7. Burlington, 849 F.2d at 1422. The Federal Circuit further observed that a 
patent litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported charge of 
“inequitable conduct in the Patent Office” is a negative contribution to the 
rightful administration of justice. The charge was formerly known as “fraud on 
the Patent Office,” a more pejorative term, but the change of name does not make 
the thing itself smell any sweeter. 
Id.; see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289; Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876 & n.15 (writing that the 
court desired to avoid a ruling that would “encourage the present proliferation of inequitable 
conduct charges” and quoting Burlington for the proposition that “the habit of charging 
inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has become an absolute plague.”). 
 8. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 9. Id. at 1365-66 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 
250-51 (1944); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 
(1945)). 
 10. Id. (citation omitted). 
 11. See generally id. 
 12. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 122. 
 13. See Target Tech. Co., LLC v. Williams Advanced Materials, Inc. No. 04-CV-1083, 
2007 WL 6201689, at *42-43 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2007). It is at the trial court’s discretion 
whether to bifurcate or try the issues of infringement, validity, and inequitable conduct 
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and the Federal Circuit’s inconsistent and unpredictable articulation 
and application.
14
 
Ultimately, the burdens imposed by the availability of an 
unenforceability defense during litigation due to inequitable conduct 
outweigh the benefits. Moreover, there are more efficient and less 
prejudicial ways to address inequitable conduct. For example, when 
the alleged misconduct is the withholding of known art, asserted 
claims will generally be held invalid in light of that art—along with a 
finding of inequitable conduct—rendering the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct superfluous.
15
 Moreover, the PTO has, and could at its 
discretion: exercise the authority to administer disciplinary sanctions 
for misconduct before the Office without need for litigation to arise 
where the unenforceability defense due to inequitable conduct is 
raised by a party.
16
 
Concerns about the application of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine during patent litigation have led to proposed legislative 
changes to the Patent Act.
17
 Naturally, some of the revisions are better 
than others. 
As discussed below the inequitable conduct doctrine could be 
eliminated from litigation without adverse effects on candor before 
the PTO,
18
 the conduct the doctrine was created to encourage,
19
 by not 
awarding the 35 U.S.C. Section 282 presumption of validity to patents 
issued where material information was not before the Examiner 
during prosecution of the subject patent. 
                                                                                                                            
separately or together. If tried separately, inefficiency and additional expense from overlap of 
facts and evidence will necessarily occur. If tried together, however, there is a risk that the jury’s 
focus may shift from relevant factual issues to the alleged wrongdoings of the patentee and/or 
his representatives and prejudice to the jury’s findings on other issues may occur. 
 14. See generally Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 769 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 15. Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: 
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 163 (2005) (“[I]n 89% of cases, courts 
found patents both unenforceable and invalid.”). 
 16. See 37 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2010). 
 17. See generally Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); Patent 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008); Patent Reform Act of 
2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 18. The PTO could address issues of insufficient candor by disciplinary proceedings. 
 19. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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A. Overarching Approaches to Application of the Inequitable 
Conduct Doctrine: Notice versus Discretion 
One perceived problem with the application of the common law 
doctrine of inequitable conduct is a lack of notice and predictability 
regarding the conduct proscribed due to a lack of a clear articulation 
of materiality and intent. 
Inequitable conduct, like most rules of law, faces at least two 
competing policy goals in this regard. On the one hand, it is desirable 
to give notice of what is required to comply with the law.
20
 This 
provides notice and leads to predictability in the application of the 
law.
21
 On the other hand, it is desirable to allow for flexibility so that 
the law can be specifically tailored to the circumstances presented 
rather than requiring a blanket application based on rigid readings.
22
 
Unfortunately, these broad policy goals are inconsistent, and the line 
is often drawn in favor of one set of goals—at the expense of others.23 
Indeed, predictability and notice on one hand, and flexibility and 
discretion on the other, are antithetical to one another.
24
 
In areas of patent law other than inequitable conduct, such as 
claim construction, the Federal Circuit generally draws the line more 
toward the side of notice and predictability—at the expense of 
flexibility and discretion.
25
 Indeed, commentators have described the 
Federal Circuit as being “preoccupied with predictability and the 
notice function of patents.”26 
                                                                                                                            
 20. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Observing 
in a different context that 
[i]n the past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence on the ground that it “sacrifices clarity and predictability for 
flexibility.” One commentator has aptly characterized this as “a euphemism . . . 
for . . . the absence of any principled rationale.” I think it time that we sacrifice 
some “flexibility” for “clarity and predictability.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). 
 23. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Meredith Martin Addy, Is the Federal Circuit Ready to Accept Plenary Authority 
for Patent Appeals?, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 583, 587 (2005) (quoting Donald R. 
Dunner, Jefferson Medalist – 2004 Address, IP MALL (June 4, 2004), 
http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/jefferson_medalists_2004_address.asp). 
 26. Id. Compare Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (holding that—
in light of the fact that the patent was a pioneering patent—and thus entitled to broad 
protection—a pilot of an aircraft that manually adjusted the controls of an aircraft was 
equivalent to a rope specified in the claim to automatically adjust the controls). Judge Learned 
Hand was more concerned with the flexibility and discretionary side of patent law. By contrast, 
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It is of course desirable to provide predictability and notice while 
maintaining discretion and flexibility. The proposed 2007 version of 
patent reform legislation seems to accomplish that goal.
27
 The 2007 
version of patent reform would have accomplished this inconsistent 
objective by codifying and standardizing the definition of 
“materiality” and “intent to deceive,” thereby promoting predictability 
regarding the requirements for compliance with the inequitable 
conduct doctrine.
28
 The discretionary component in the 2007 version 
of patent reform would have come from the ability of a court to 
fashion a remedy to the particular facts after a finding of inequitable 
conduct, rather than being bound to find all claims invalid.
29
 The 2007 
version, as well as other versions of patent reform, is discussed below. 
Before discussing patent reform, the concerns with the common law 
doctrine of inequitable conduct should be addressed in more detail in 
order to determine the desired changes through legislative or judicial 
reform. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Therasense—the Current—but Uncertain and Unstable State 
of the Law 
On May 25, 2011, the Federal Circuit en banc, in deciding 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., attempted to rein in the 
consequences of inequitable conduct in patent litigation. The majority 
opinion, joined by six judges and authored by Judge Rader, 
“[r]ecogniz[ed] the problems created by expansion and overuse of the 
inequitable conduct doctrine,” as the reason for granting the en banc 
petition.
30
 The majority opinion outlined the history of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine and observed that the doctrine was initially 
concerned “with particularly egregious misconduct, including perjury, 
the manufacture of false evidence, and the suppression of evidence.”31 
The majority opinion disapproved of inequitable conduct’s role 
                                                                                                                            
the Federal Circuit would most likely not consider anything more than a steel cable as being 
equivalent to a rope in such a patent. 
 27. See S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 298 (2007). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15  
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989). 
 30. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 31. Id. at 1287. 
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as “a significant litigation strategy. A charge of inequitable conduct 
conveniently expands discovery into corporate practices before patent 
filing and disqualifies the prosecuting attorney from the patentee’s 
litigation team.”32 Indeed, “[l]eft unfettered, the inequitable conduct 
doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent 
system.”33 
The majority thus disapproved of the “sliding scale” approach, 
where a weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a 
strong showing of materiality and vice versa.
34
 “[A] court must weigh 
the evidence of intent to deceive independent of its analysis of 
materiality.”35 The majority opinion observed that it had in the past 
attempted to reduce the proliferation of inequitable conduct charges 
by “raising the intent standard” and making clear that “gross 
negligence alone was not enough to justify an inference of intent to 
deceive.”36 The majority stated that the intent to deceive prong of 
inequitable conduct requires showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that “the applicant knew of the reference, knew that it was 
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold it” and when 
only circumstantial evidence of intent to deceive was discovered, the 
conclusion of intent to deceive must be “the most reasonable 
inference.”37 
Because the majority felt that raising the intent standard alone 
was not effective in reducing the number of inequitable conduct 
allegations, the majority opinion adjusted the materiality standard to 
require but-for materiality.
38
 However, the majority opinion left open 
the door for allegations of inequitable conduct where an act was not 
material under a but-for test, but where misconduct was 
“egregious.”39 Thus, while purporting to eliminate the “sliding scale” 
the majority opinion seems to retain a sliding scale by tying 
“egregious misconduct” to the required showing of materiality.40 
                                                                                                                            
 32. Id. at 1288 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 122). 
 33. Id. at 1289. 
 34. Id. at 1290. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1291 (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 
876 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989)). 
 37. Id. at 1290. 
 38. Id. at 1291. In adopting that standard of materiality, the majority opinion specifically 
held that the PTO articulation of the broader definition of materiality in PTO Rule 56 is not 
controlling for purposes of inequitable conduct allegations in litigation. Id. at 1293-94. 
 39. Id. at 1292-93. 
 40. Id. 
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By including the “egregious conduct” exception, the majority 
opinion also significantly weakens any benefit that might have been 
gained from the opinion. Just as the Federal Circuit’s prior attempt to 
reduce the role of inequitable conduct in litigation by clarifying the 
required intent threshold to exclude gross negligence largely failed, 
the majority’s attempt to curb the role of such inequitable conduct 
allegations in litigation by clarifying the materiality standard will 
likely fail. Attorneys will continue to assert inequitable conduct in 
nearly every litigation based on “egregious misconduct” or by 
claiming that the information “but-for” caused at least one claim to 
issue.
41
 Thus, the majority’s attempt to retain flexibility in the 
application of the inequitable conduct doctrine will result in continued 
problems with the application of such doctrine during litigation. 
Judge O’Malley concurred-in-part and dissented-in-part in 
Therasense.
42
 Judge O’Malley favored a flexible approach with an 
undefined standard of materiality, apparently at the expense of notice 
and certainty during litigation.
43
 A four-judge dissent in Therasense 
advocated retaining the current state of inequitable conduct and use of 
the PTO’s current standard of materiality, set forth in Rule 56.44 
 While the effects of Therasense are yet to be seen, it is not 
likely to significantly change the role of inequitable conduct during 
patent litigation. The charge of inequitable conduct will continue to 
appear in most major patent litigations. Moreover, the United States 
Supreme Court might hear the case during its new term, and the 
Defendant in Therasense intends to seek a stay of the Federal 
Circuit’s ruling in the interim.45  
                                                                                                                            
 41. The difference of course between this standard of materiality and a finding of 
invalidity based on the subject information is “but-for materiality” sufficient to find a single 
claim invalid under the inequitable conduct doctrine would render every claim of the patent and 
possible all claims of related patents unenforceable. 
 42. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1296 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 43. Id. at 1298. 
 44. Id. at 1303. 
 45. Mike Sobolev, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co.: A Radical Change in 
the Legal Standard of Inequitable Conduct, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. BOLT (June 22, 2011), 
http://btlj.org/?p=1290. 
Allegedly, Becton-Dickinson filed a motion to stay the issuance of the mandate 
of the case pending its petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Due to 
the drastic changes affected by Therasense and the Supreme Court’s recent 
penchant for reviewing Federal Circuit decisions, it would not be surprising if 
these new standards are rejected or modified within the next few years.  
Id. 
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B. Concerns with the Application of the Common Law 
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine—Pre-Therasense Case Law 
Because of the uncertain status of Therasense, it is helpful to 
examine issues with the inequitable conduct doctrine that lead the 
Federal Circuit to attempt to change the state of the inequitable 
conduct law in Therasense. 
1. The “Materiality” Standard 
a. The Materiality Standard Has Been Articulated in 
Varying Manners in an Apparent Attempt to 
Retain Discretion, at the Expense of Notice and 
Predictability. 
As discussed above, in an apparent attempt to retain discretion in 
the application of the inequitable conduct doctrine, the Federal Circuit 
struggled with a single materiality standard for purposes of 
litigation.
46
 The PTO defines the term “material” in Rule 56.47 Before 
Therasense, courts would generally cite to Rule 56 when considering 
the materiality prong of an inequitable conduct charge during 
litigation, but the Federal Circuit, even before Therasense, indicated 
that it is not bound by the PTO’s articulation of materiality, which 
served as a useful “starting point” in a materiality determination.48 
However, before Therasense, the Federal Circuit failed to adopt any 
other useful definition of materiality.
49
 Indeed, the Federal Circuit 
recognized that at least four different standards of materiality have 
been used by the court in determining inequitable conduct.
50
 Adding 
to the mix, in 1992, the PTO adopted a different definition of 
materiality in Rule 56, which has also been referenced by, but not 
                                                                                                                            
 46. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 47. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2010). 
 48. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“The PTO 
standard is the appropriate starting point because it is the broadest and because it most closely 
aligns with how one ought to conduct business with the PTO.”). 
 49. Id. 
It has been indicated that the threshold can be established by any of four tests: (1) 
objective “but for”; (2) subjective “but for”; (3) “but it may have been”; and (4) 
PTO Rule 1.56(a), i.e., whether there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
examiner would have considered the omitted reference or false information 
important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. 
Id. 
 50. Id. 
13 JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:26 AM 
206 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
clearly adopted by the Federal Circuit during litigation.
51
 Therefore, 
there are at least five definitions of materiality that have been 
referenced by the Federal Circuit.
52
 
The pre-1992 version of Rule 56 provided that information is 
material “where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow 
the application to issue as a patent” (the “reasonable examiner 
standard”).53 The “prima facie case standard” is codified in the 
current version of Rule 56, which provides that: 
information is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to 
information already of record or being made of record in the 
application, and (1) it establishes, by itself or in combination with 
other information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; 
or (2) it refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant 
takes in: (i) opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by 
the Office, or (ii) asserting an argument of patentability.
54
  
Over time, before Therasense, the Federal Circuit moved away 
from the more restrictive “but for tests” for materiality, while 
struggling to clearly establish whether the appropriate standard in 
litigation was the old version or the new version of Rule 56.
55
 In 
2003, The Federal Circuit analyzed which of the two Rule 56 
materiality standards should apply, but ultimately wrote that 
“[b]ecause . . . the outcome of this appeal would be the same under 
either materiality standard, we leave for another day a final 
disposition of this issue.”56 
                                                                                                                            
 51. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1992). 
 52. See J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559; Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 
F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 53. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991). The “reasonable examiner” standard is generally considered 
the broadest interpretation of materiality. It is not clear, however, why it is broader than the 
prima facie case standard because it is not clear why a reasonable examiner would want to know 
about something that does not constitute a prima facie case of unpatentability. Regardless, the 
Federal Circuit has stated that the older “reasonable examiner” standard is “arguably” broader 
than the new “prima facie case of unpatentability” standard. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles 
Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The “but for” tests were narrower, 
requiring a showing that the patent would not have issued but for the information being omitted. 
Id. at 1316. 
 54. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010). It remains to be seen whether compliance with Rule 56 will 
be a consideration in whether an applicant acted with “egregious misconduct” such that a “but-
for” finding of materiality need not be shown, under the Therasense test. Logically, it is difficult 
to see how “egregious misconduct” could occur if an applicant complied with Rule 56. 
 55. See Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 56. Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
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Thereafter, on February 1, 2006, the Federal Circuit in Purdue 
Pharma, L.P. v. Endo Pharms., Inc.
57
 applied the new Rule 56 prima 
facie case of patentability test, writing, that “[i]n evaluating 
materiality, this court has consistently referred to the standard set 
forth in PTO Rule 56.”58 The court continued, “[b]ecause all of the 
patent applications at issue in this case were pending on or filed after 
March 16, 1992,
59
 we look to the current version of Rule 56, rather 
than the pre-1992 version of the rule.”60 
Just one week later, however, the Federal Circuit applied the old 
reasonable examiner test, writing that “[f]or many years, we have held 
that ‘materiality for purposes of an inequitable conduct determination 
require[s] a showing that “a reasonable examiner would have 
considered such prior art important in deciding whether to allow the 
parent application.”’”61 The court ultimately concluded that the 
“reasonable examiner” standard and case law interpreting that 
standard were not supplanted by the PTO’s adoption of a new Rule 
56, and thus materiality during litigation was determined according to 
the older and “arguably broader” “reasonable examiner” standard.62 
Thus, according to pre-Therasense Federal Circuit precedent, even if 
a prosecuting attorney complied with the current version of Rule 56 at 
trial she could be found to have committed inequitable conduct under 
the older, arguably broader “reasonable examiner standard.”63 
Since then the Federal Circuit has primarily used the old 
“reasonable examiner standard” in determining materiality during 
                                                                                                                            
2003). 
 57. Purdue, 438 F.3d 1123. 
 58. Id. at 1129. 
 59. March 16, 1992, is the date that the new version of Rule 56 took effect. 57 Fed. Reg. 
2021, 2021-34 (Jan. 17, 1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56). 
 60. Purdue, 438 F.3d at 1129. 
 61. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Dayco, 329 F.3d at 1363). 
 62. Id. at 1316. This was despite the fact that one week prior, in Purdue (cited by the 
Digital Control court), the court had said that the new version of Rule 56 applied to materiality 
determinations for patents filed after 1992, as the patents were in Digital Control. Id. 
 63. The PTO generally gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent 
with the specification when determining patentability. See, e.g., In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech 
Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Therefore, it is possible that even if the same 
standard of materiality is used both during prosecution and litigation, a reference could be 
material during prosecution of an application but not during litigation, if the district court 
construes the claims more narrowly than did the examiner. In theory, however, the opposite 
should not be true. Unless the examiner errs in construing the claim terms during prosecution—
giving them too narrow of an interpretation—there should not be a time when a reference is 
material during litigation, but it was not during prosecution—provided the same standard of 
materiality is applied in both venues. 
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litigation.
64
 However, the Federal Circuit occasionally referred to the 
new version of Rule 56.
65
 In 2009, the Federal Circuit again 
acknowledged that a uniform standard for materiality had yet to be 
established, observing that twenty-four years earlier
66
 it had identified 
four tests for materiality but still failed to conclusively identify a 
particular standard.
67
 The court did write, however, that “[w]hile a 
uniform standard has not been rigorously applied in the courts, the 
fourth test of whether a reasonable examiner would have considered 
the information important in deciding whether to grant the patent, 
even when the omitted information does not negate patentability, is 
most often employed.”68 
Ultimately, while Therasense provides some guidance that 
generally “but for” materiality must be shown, wherein at least one 
claim of the patent at issue must be shown invalid by the undisclosed 
information, the majority’s opinion remains unclear as to the scope of 
its “egregious misconduct” exception to “but for” materiality and 
whether one of the other previously used standards of materiality 
might be employed to make a determination of “egregious 
misconduct.” 
b. Materiality Determinations Necessarily Require 
Attorney or Agent Judgment 
Regardless of what standard for “materiality” is applied during 
litigation, patent prosecuting attorneys and agents must make 
judgments regarding whether a reference is “material” on limited 
budgets. The best practice for prosecuting attorneys appears to be a 
policy of being overly inclusive and submitting all references that are 
                                                                                                                            
 64. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 65. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (discussing both the old “reasonable examiner” standard and the new “prima facie” case 
version of Rule 56); Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharms. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 
2006). 
We see no error in the ruling of the district court that the [data was] not material 
under either Rule 56 standard. There is no evidence that the withheld 
comparative test data establishes by itself or in combination with other 
information a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim. 
Id. at 1377. 
 66. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 166 n.19 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985). 
 67. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 773 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 68. Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. MOVA Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 
2000)). 
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remotely related to the invention that the prosecuting attorney is 
aware of, regardless of whether the prosecuting attorney subjectively 
believes that the references are “material” or “cumulative” in order to 
avoid a later charge of inequitable conduct because of a different 
subjective understanding of the reference. 
This incentive to over-cite references is problematic. This 
practice increases the burden on the PTO by causing the examiner to 
review references of marginal relevance.
69
 More troubling from the 
perspective of the patentee and its representatives—there is case law 
holding that intent to deceive and inequitable conduct may be based 
on a finding that the prosecuting attorney cited too much art and 
intended to hide a reference by “burying” it along with other 
references cited to the PTO.
70
 
Consequently, a prosecuting attorney or agent must necessarily 
make certain subjective judgments regarding whether to submit prior 
art.
71
 If he makes an error in judgment or uses the wrong standard of 
materiality
72
 and submits too little or too much art, his client could 
                                                                                                                            
 69. Brief of Amicus Curiae Boston Patent Law Association Neutral as to Parties at 11, 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Nos. 
04-CV-2123, 04-CV-3327, 04-CV-3732, 05-CV-3117). See generally Benjamin K. Sovacool, 
Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede 
Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 407 
(2008). 
 70. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., Inc., 837 F. 
Supp. 1444, 1477 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff’d, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 
1128 (1994). 
The court further holds that it is likewise a violation of the duty of candor and 
fair dealing with the Patent Office for an applicant or its attorney to disclose a 
pertinent prior art patent reference to the examiner in such a way as to “bury” it 
or its disclosures in a series of disclosures of less relevant prior art references, so 
that the examiner would be likely to ignore the entire list and permit the 
application to issue. 
Id. 
 71. See Purdue Pharma Prods. L.P. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 329, 377 n.57 (D. 
Del. 2009). 
There is an undeniable tension between, on the one hand, cases that say that “[a]n 
applicant can not [sic] be guilty of inequitable conduct if the reference was cited 
to the examiner,” Fiskars, Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2000), and those that say, on the other, that “‘burying’ a particularly material 
reference in a prior art statement containing a multiplicity of other references can 
be probative of bad faith,” Molins [PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184 
(Fed. Cir. 1995)]. 
Id. 
 72. As long as the prosecuting attorney complies with the new “prima facie” case 
standard of materiality under new Rule 56 during prosecution, even if the older, and “arguably 
broader” old version of Rule 56, the “reasonable examiner” standard, is employed during 
litigation, the standards are probably sufficiently similar that an attorney may not be found to 
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face a charge of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct during 
litigation. In light of limited budgets, the subjective nature of the 
analysis, whether information is cumulative, and the not-yet clearly 
defined term “materiality” discussed above, this doctrine can place 
prosecuting attorneys in a difficult position.
73
 
c. Materiality Does Not Require that a Withheld 
Reference Render any of the Claims of the 
Asserted Patent Invalid in Litigation 
Until Therasense, “but-for”74 causation for materiality was not 
required—a patent could be rendered unenforceable for inequitable 
conduct even though the withheld information would not render any 
of the claims of the patent invalid.
75
 Although disciplinary action by 
the PTO might be appropriate under those circumstances, there does 
not appear to be a compelling reason why a patent should be rendered 
unenforceable if the withheld information would not render any of the 
claims invalid.
76
 Under those circumstances, neither the public nor the 
accused infringer was prejudiced
77
 by the information not
78
 being 
                                                                                                                            
have withheld material information (or submitted too much information in an attempt to “bury” 
the reference) based on that distinction alone. In light of the seriousness of the charge, both in 
the sense of the monetary value of some patents and the reputational value of such a charge to 
the subject prosecuting attorney, fundamental fairness dictates that notice should be clearly 
provided regarding the actual standards to be employed in determining materiality during 
litigation. 
 73. In some areas of technology understanding each reference sufficiently to make such 
judgment about materiality and cumulativeness can be very time consuming. 
 74. Again, even under the Therasense majority opinion, “but for” materiality is not 
required for undefined “egregious misconduct.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 
649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). See supra text accompanying notes 39, 40. 
 75. See, e.g., Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (Bryson, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (“The doctrine of inequitable 
conduct is not so narrow that it applies only when patent claims are invalid. Li Second Family 
Ltd. P’ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (‘Information concealed 
from the PTO may be material even though it would not invalidate the patent.’)”); Merck & Co., 
Inc. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 873 F.2d 1418, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“That the claimed 
invention may have been superior . . . to both the cited and withheld prior art may be a basis for 
patentability; it cannot serve automatically to render the withheld prior art either cumulative or 
immaterial.”); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (noting 
that whether the claims may be patentable over the withheld prior art is not the test for 
materiality). 
 76. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 10.23 (2010). 
 77. If “but for” causation was required before withheld information was considered 
material the patent would generally be held invalid in litigation based on that withheld 
information (depending upon relative claim interpretation during prosecution and litigation). 
 78. The PTO could still issue sanctions under those circumstances for a violation of its 
rules. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 11.18 (2010). 
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before the examiner. Such a result amounts to a windfall for the 
accused infringer and seems to be an overly harsh result for the 
patentee. 
2. The Intent Element of Inequitable Conduct is 
Inconsistently Applied, Difficult to Administer, and 
Expensive to Litigate 
a. Intent Has Been Applied in Varying Manners in 
the Inequitable Conduct Analysis 
The common and ordinary meaning of “intent” is: “Design, 
resolve, or determination with which [a] person acts[; a] state of mind 
in which a person seeks to accomplish a given result through a course 
of action.”79 Intent therefore refers to a subjectively desired result. 
With respect to the inequitable conduct doctrine, “the intent to 
deceive may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances rather 
than by direct evidence.”80 “[T]he intent necessary to establish 
inequitable conduct is based on a sliding scale related to materiality of 
the omission.”81 “[T]he more material the omission or the 
misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required to establish 
inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”82 
Early on, the Federal Circuit held that “intent” is a subjective 
term that can be demonstrated by an objective showing of “gross 
negligence.”83 “Aside from direct evidence of wrongful intent—i.e., 
deliberate scheming—intent may be proven by a showing of acts the 
natural consequences of which are presumably intended by the 
actor.”84 The court thus held that “[t]he lower threshold for finding 
intent is therefore satisfied by evidence of gross negligence.”85 The 
Federal Circuit, by the above-quoted language in Hycor Corp. v. 
                                                                                                                            
 79. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (alteration in 
original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990). 
 80. Abbott Labs. v. Torpharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing 
Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Monon Corp. v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 239 F.3d 1253, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1256); Akzo N.V. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 808 F.2d 1471, 
1481-82 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 909 (1987). The Therasense majority opinion 
will likely prove unsuccessful in eliminating the sliding scale, based on its “egregious 
misconduct” exception. 
 83. Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 84. Id. (citing Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Am. 
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 85. Id. 
13 JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:26 AM 
212 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
Schlueter Co., apparently combined objective and subjective 
standards. The court asserted that the actor “presumably intended” 
consequences of his actions when in fact, negligence or gross 
negligence means that the actor did not necessarily presume or was 
not even necessarily aware of the consequences of his actions.
86
 
Indeed, intent is irrelevant to a finding of negligence, which is based 
on an objective reasonable person standard rather than any 
subjectively desired result of the actor.
87
 
Over time, Federal Circuit cases generally came to reject its 
earlier decisions indicating that gross negligence may be sufficient to 
infer an intent to deceive. In Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. 
USA, Inc., the court stated: 
[e]vidence of mistake or negligence, even gross negligence, is not 
sufficient to support inequitable conduct in patent prosecution. To 
establish the requisite deceptive intent, “the involved conduct, 
viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of 
good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding 
of intent to deceive.”
88
 
The Federal Circuit’s more stringent articulation of the intent 
element of inequitable conduct may be seen as a recognition that the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct has grown
89
 beyond its original 
purpose.
90
 For example, in a strongly worded dissent, Judge Rader 
                                                                                                                            
 86. See Sedgmer v. McElroy Coal Co., 640 S.E.2d 129, 133 (W. Va. 2006) (noting that 
negligence is irrelevant to a discussion of deliberate intent). 
 87. See id. at 134. 
 88. Astrazeneca Pharm. LP v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 776 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (quoting Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (internal citation omitted). 
 89. Judge Rader observed that the Federal Circuit still appears to give too little weight to 
the intent element but instead tends to merge it with the materiality element. Aventis Pharma 
S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(“More recently, however, the judicial process has too often emphasized materiality almost to 
the exclusion of any analysis of the lofty intent requirement for inequitable conduct. Merging 
intent and materiality at levels far below the Kingsdown rule has revived the inequitable conduct 
tactic.”). 
 90. The Federal Circuit’s cases seem to show an evolution requiring a higher showing of 
actual intent to deceive. In initially moving away from the gross negligence standard the court 
articulated that  
[w]e adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to “gross 
negligence” does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the 
involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence 
indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding 
of intent to deceive. 
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989) (emphasis added). That articulation seems to indicate that gross 
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observed that “[a]lthough designed to facilitate USPTO examination, 
inequitable conduct has taken on a new life as a litigation tactic.”91 
Indeed, in Therasense, the majority opinion again appeared to 
tighten the intent requirement, by stating that gross negligence was 
not enough to satisfy the intent element and that intent could only be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence that “the applicant knew of 
the reference, knew it was material, and made a deliberate decision to 
withhold it.”92 However, the Therasense court left open the possibility 
that intent could be proven by circumstantial evidence when intent to 
deceive was “the single most reasonable inference.”93 
b. Intent Usually Must Be Proven by Circumstantial 
Evidence 
Intent is generally inferred from the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the applicant’s overall conduct; taking into account 
evidence of good and bad faith.
94
 Because there generally is not direct 
evidence of bad faith, most cases rely on circumstantial
95
 evidence.
96
 
                                                                                                                            
negligence may be relevant to the inquiry, supports a showing of intent, but insufficient in itself 
to show intent. However, the most recent cases have indicated that gross negligence does not 
“support a ruling of inequitable conduct,” which appears to be a more stringent standard for a 
showing of intent. Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 91. Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting). Judge Rader also noted that  
[t]his phenomenon is not new or unprecedented. At an earlier time, the Federal 
Circuit also observed that inequitable conduct as a litigation strategy had become 
a “plague.” Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 
1988). In response, this court took a case to reduce abuse of inequitable conduct. 
Kingsdown Med. Consultant, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (en banc). In light of the rejuvenation of the inequitable conduct tactic, this 
court ought to revisit occasionally its Kingsdown opinion. 
Id. at 1350 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 92. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 95. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have also held 
that because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rarely available, such intent can be inferred 
from indirect and circumstantial evidence.”); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that intent need not be proven by direct evidence; it is most often 
proven “by a showing of acts the natural consequences of which are presumably intended by the 
actor.”); Paragon Podiatry Lab., Inc. v. KLM Labs., Inc., 984 F.2d 1182, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 
1993) (observing that generally, intent must be inferred from the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the applicant’s conduct). 
 96. This is not to suggest that circumstantial evidence categorically is inherently less 
reliable than direct evidence. Indeed, the Federal Rules specifically reject that categorical 
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c. The Sliding Scale 
Although the Federal Circuit has emphasized that minimum 
thresholds of both materiality and intent must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence, after making such a showing, the district court 
“look[s] to the equities by weighing the facts underlying those 
showings.”97 “The more material the omission or the 
misrepresentation, the lower [the] level of intent [is] required to 
establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”98 The Federal Circuit 
explained at one point that 
At this second stage, however, the question is no longer whether 
materiality and/or intent to deceive were proven with evidence that 
is sufficiently clear and convincing. While the facts of materiality 
and intent to deceive must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence, the district court must balance the substance of those 
now-proven facts and all the equities of the case to determine 
whether the severe penalty of unenforceability should be 
imposed.
99
 
Many cases have confirmed that regardless of the degree of 
materiality, intent cannot be inferred.
100
 As recently as 2006 the 
Federal Circuit wrote that when materiality is low “there is less basis 
for inferring intent from materiality alone,” implying that there may 
be circumstances where intent could be inferred from materiality 
alone.
101
 
It is not readily apparent why a high degree of materiality should 
lessen the separate element of intent.
102
 As the courts have 
                                                                                                                            
approach. See Richard K. Greenstein, Determining Facts: The Myth of Direct Evidence, 45 
HOUS. L. REV. 1801, 1803 (2009) (but noting that many states imply or directly state to juries 
that circumstantial evidence is less reliable than direct evidence). Any time a fact finder must 
ascertain what a person was actually thinking there is likely to be a high degree of error (absent 
the extraordinarily rare occasion where there might be a tangible record of actual intent in the 
form of a document or third-party testimony of actual expressed intent). 
 97. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1365. 
 98. Id. at 1367 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 
F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). Again, despite language that disapproves of the “sliding 
scale” in the majority opinion, the effect of Therasense on this analysis is unclear—at least 
where “egregious misconduct” is alleged. 
 99. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367. 
 100. See, e.g., Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. 
 101. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1134-35 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
The continued validity of this statement is questionable in light of Therasense. 
 102. See, e.g., Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. 
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recognized, these two elements are entirely separate inquiries.
103
 
In addition to this analytical problem, it is also unclear exactly 
how this balancing is to proceed. Initially, it is unclear whether the 
lower level of intent is in reference to the amount
104
 of intent or the 
amount of proof of intent that is required for a finding of inequitable 
conduct. The former is troublesome because “intent” does not seem to 
have varying degrees—it is either present or it is not.105 In contrast to 
terms that may have varying degrees or amounts an individual cannot 
have varying degrees or amounts of intent, just as an individual 
cannot have varying degrees or amounts of death.
106
 
If the sliding scale of a lesser showing of intent instead refers to 
a lesser amount of proof
107
 being required for a finding of intent to 
deceive where there is also a high degree of materiality shown, this 
analysis is also troubling. First, because as previously mentioned, the 
initial step requires that the finder of fact
108
 determine that both 
materiality and intent have been shown by clear and convincing 
evidence before the court balances the two and makes the ultimate 
determination of whether inequitable conduct has occurred.
109
 Thus, 
the sliding scale should not even be considered by the court unless 
intent has already been proven by clear and convincing evidence, 
                                                                                                                            
 103. See id. 
 104. This would seem to be the appropriate reading of some Federal Circuit case law. See 
Halliburton Co. v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 925 F.2d 1435, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“The more 
material the omission, the less culpable the intent required, and vice versa.”). 
 105. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis omitted) (“intent. (13c) 1. 
The state of mind accompanying an act, esp. a forbidden act. • While motive is the inducement 
to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it.”). 
 106. Benjamin Franklin is credited with coining the phrase “[i]n this world nothing is 
certain but death and taxes.” Benjamin Franklin Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/b/benjaminfr151592.html (last visited Dec. 15, 
2011). To the extent that the Federal Circuit has rejected the idea of gross negligence serving as 
a ground for “intent,” see Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
and as long as the term “intent” is used in its pure, subjective state of mind sense—the desire to 
bring about a certain result—intent is either present or it is not. 
 107. In Purdue, the Federal Circuit indicated that a lesser amount or quantum of proof of 
intent was required when a high degree of materiality was shown. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo 
Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2006). See also PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. 
Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (in cases where 
the omission or misrepresentation is highly material, “less evidence of intent will be required in 
order to find that inequitable conduct has occurred.”). 
 108. Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Materiality . . . and intent are both questions of fact, and require proof by clear and convincing 
evidence.”). 
 109. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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meaning that regardless of the degree of materiality, intent cannot 
drop below the clear and convincing quantum of proof.
110
 Moreover, 
and maybe more importantly, it simply does not make sense to require 
less proof of intent where there is higher showing of materiality, 
where the two prongs are entirely separate
111
 and unrelated in some 
circumstances.
112
 
In actuality, the sliding scale was most likely a means for the 
courts to retain discretion in the application of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine. The sliding scale was an attempt to “balance the substance 
of” all of the facts and all the equities “to determine whether the 
severe penalty of unenforceability should be imposed.”113 However, 
as discussed above, the sliding scale does not make sense
114—and its 
                                                                                                                            
 110. See id. at 1367 (“At this second stage, however, the question is no longer whether 
materiality and/or intent to deceive were proven with evidence that is sufficiently clear and 
convincing.”). 
 111. This is analogous to saying in cases of a person being charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol, where she was shown to be very drunk, less proof that she was actually 
driving need be shown than if she was just a little drunk. In both instances the elements are 
separate and there does not seem to be a logical reason to reduce the burden of proof with 
respect to a showing on one element in the face of a higher degree or showing on the other 
element. 
 112. For instance, if the applicant asserts that she was unaware of a prior art reference—
the degree of materiality of the reference is not probative of whether she was indeed aware of it 
with respect to the intent prong of the inequitable conduct inquiry. The high degree of 
materiality does not make it more likely that she was aware of such reference than a low degree 
of materiality would. If it is established that the applicant was aware of the reference but the 
dispute is whether she intended to withhold or deceive by withholding the reference one might 
be able to make an argument that an applicant might be more likely to withhold a highly 
material reference than a less material reference and thus intent to deceive could properly be 
inferred from the withholding of a more material reference. However, that may not always be 
the case. See Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent that Holds 
up in Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION 515, 523 (2006). Indeed, an applicant might be more 
likely to disclose to the examiner a highly material reference—at least where the reference is 
publically available—so that the applicant has an opportunity to address the reference in the 
patent application and during prosecution (because the PTO does its own search and may find 
the subject reference). See id. This would seem to be a theory behind many applicants choosing 
to conduct prior art searches when filing applications. See id. Ultimately, there are simply too 
many variables and the materiality and intent prongs are too far removed and distinct from one 
another to draw any inference with respect to intent based on the degree of materiality. 
 113. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367. 
 114. A better way than the sliding scale to retain that discretion and flexibility is set forth 
in the 2007 version of patent reform. It requires, for a finding of inequitable conduct, that intent 
and materiality be separately proven without respect to any sliding scale. After such a finding, 
however, it provides the court discretion in the application of a remedy. This is discussed below, 
but in essence it would provide clear notice of requirements to avoid a finding of inequitable 
conduct while retaining flexibility with respect to the remedy imposed under all of the facts and 
circumstances. 
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application has been reduced by Therasense.
115
 
3. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Increases the Cost of 
Litigation 
 The cost of litigation has become a real concern.
116
 In patent 
infringement cases, the cost of litigating inequitable conduct during 
patent prosecution is particularly high because of the factually 
intensive nature of the charge.
117
 In particular, the subjective intent to 
deceive element generally lacks direct evidence and must be proven
118
 
by costly-to-obtain circumstantial evidence.
119
 Moreover, third-party 
discovery is nearly always sought from the prosecuting attorney, often 
both in the form of document requests and live deposition 
testimony.
120
 This often leads to difficult questions of privilege
121
 that 
must be decided by the court through discovery motions. The high 
cost of obtaining discovery and litigating charges of inequitable 
conduct militates against the continuation of the availability of the 
inequitable conduct defense—at least in its current form. 
4. The Inequitable Conduct Doctrine May Tarnish the 
Reputation of Prosecuting Attorneys and the Bar in 
General 
Allegations of inequitable conduct often involve a charge of 
                                                                                                                            
 115. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 116. See, e.g., id. at 1288; see also THE AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON 
DISCOVERY & THE INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT 
(2009) (discussing inefficiency and burden of litigation and discovery in general and 
recommending streamlining procedures to help reduce the cost). 
 117. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 740 (2009). 
 118. Being an equitable doctrine, the ultimate decision of whether inequitable conduct has 
occurred is a question for the court but it is based on underlying factual issues that, in a jury 
trial, must be determined by the jury. See, e.g., Eisai Co. Ltd. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 
F.3d 1353, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see also HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ & ROBERT J. GOLDMAN, 
PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 277 n.67 (6th ed. 2008) (gathering cases which decided, among 
other things, that if a jury determines underlying factual issues relating to inequitable conduct or 
common factual issues affecting both inequitable conduct and legal issues, the court is bound by 
those findings). 
 119. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5. 
 120. Cotropia, supra note 117, at 740 (footnotes omitted) (“[T]he deposition of the 
prosecuting attorney who handled the application is almost always necessary in the inequitable 
conduct inquiry. Such depositions are uniquely costly because they are littered with complex 
attorney-client privilege issues that generate their own legal questions which demand additional 
attorney and judicial resources to resolve.”). 
 121. Id. 
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misconduct by the prosecuting attorney.
122
 These allegations are 
generally not successful.
123
 However, they still may tarnish the 
reputation of the attorneys implicated by the allegations.
124
 This 
tarnishment also diminishes the reputation of all lawyers.
125
 
In light of these concerns, another federal court has recently 
attempted to curb the liberal use of inequitable conduct during 
litigation.
126
 In reality, it is not the fault of the litigation attorneys who 
assert the defense but rather a built-in consequence of the doctrine 
itself. During litigation, a litigating attorney arguably has an ethical 
obligation to assert the defense of inequitable conduct if there is any 
good faith basis for doing so.
127
 Consequently, as long as the law 
remains in its current form, an abundance of marginal inequitable 
conduct assertions undoubtedly continue to be raised. 
Patent prosecuting attorneys and patent agents generally do not 
intend to deceive the PTO. In addition, there is often little incentive 
for a prosecuting attorney to do so. Most patent attorneys charge a 
relatively small amount—between $10,000 and $30,000—to draft and 
prosecute a patent application
128
 and prosecuting attorneys will often 
be involved with the prosecution of dozens, if not hundreds of 
applications, at any given time. It seems unlikely that most 
prosecuting attorneys would risk their reputation and livelihood by 
intentionally making misrepresentations to the PTO in order to get a 
single application issued.
129
 Indeed, even without regard to the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct, if a prosecuting attorney is found to 
have withheld material information he is subject to sanctions by the 
                                                                                                                            
 122. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. (observing that allegations of inequitable conduct tarnish the reputation of 
prosecuting attorneys even when the allegations are not proven). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Mem. & Order Re: Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.; Pl.’s Rule 56(f) Mot. at 8, Z-Line 
Designs, Inc. v. Planet 3, LLC, No. C 09-01153 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 2710122 
(quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (“The court reminds 
counsel for defendant of the Federal Circuit’s admonition concerning the practice of routinely 
accusing adversaries of inequitable conduct: ‘[U]unjustified accusations of inequitable conduct 
are offensive and unprofessional.’”). 
 127. “A lawyer has the responsibility of representing his client to the fullest extent 
possible, within the bounds of the law.” Commonwealth v. Rubright, 414 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. 
1980) (citing the MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-1). 
 128. Leah C. Fletcher, Equal Treatment Under Patent Law: A Proposed Exception to the 
On-Sale Bar, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 209, 230 (2005). 
 129. There may be exceptions for complex applications that during the prosecution stage 
are expected to be asserted in litigation after issuance, in which case there may be incentives for 
prosecuting attorneys to withhold material information from the PTO. 
13 JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:26 AM 
2012] INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN PATENT LITIGATION 219 
PTO including suspension of his ability to practice before the PTO.
130
 
The abundance of inequitable conduct charges involving 
prosecuting attorneys may be a product of the relatively small 
prosecution budget relative to the large budgets that usually 
accompany patent litigation. Attorneys’ fees to try a patent case range 
from one million dollars for a very simple case, to four to six million 
dollars for a case of average complexity, to ten to twelve million 
dollars or more for complex cases.
131
 Therefore, the charges of 
inequitable conduct involving a prosecuting attorney may reflect in 
part the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, with the advantage of millions of 
dollars of litigation resources devoted to second-guessing choices 
made on a limited budget, rather than any conscious decision on the 
part of the prosecuting attorney or agent to intentionally deceive the 
PTO. 
C. Statutory Reforms Affecting the Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine 
1. The Current Reform—H.R. 1249 
On September 16, 2011, President Barack Obama signed into 
law H.R. 1249.
132
 This legislation affects patents in major ways 
including implementing a modified “first to file” rather than first to 
invent framework.
133
 The effects of those modifications to 35 U.S.C. 
are well beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, H.R. 1249 also will have some effect on allegations of 
inequitable conduct during litigation. Although the Act does not 
mention the words “inequitable conduct” it provides for a new section 
to 35 U.S.C., section 257.
134
 Section 257 provides for a “supplemental 
examination proceedings” before the Patent and Trademark Office in 
order to reduce the effects of charges of inequitable conduct in patent 
litigation.
135
 The amendment allows the patent owner to request 
                                                                                                                            
 130. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 11.18 (2010); Jeanne C. Curtis et al., Litigation Issues Relevant 
to Patent Prosecution – The Defense of Inequitable Conduct, in FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT 
PROSECUTION 229 (2007). 
 131. Bryan W. Cooper, Patent Enforcement Through Litigation, in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
PATENT PROSECUTION 137, 167 (2005). 
 132. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ29/pdf/PLAW-112publ29.pdf (to be 
codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 133. See id. § 3. 
 134. Id. § 12. 
 135. Id. 
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consideration of new information for an issued patent.
136
 If a 
“substantial question of patentability” is shown, the patent is put into 
reexamination proceedings.
137
 Information considered during a 
supplemental examination proceeding may not be used during 
litigation on that patent to hold the subject patent unenforceable for 
inequitable conduct.
138
 However, the supplemental examination 
safeguard is only available to a patent owner if the supplemental 
proceeding request is completed before allegations of inequitable 
conduct are pleaded in a patent infringement case in the district 
court.
139
 Therefore, charges of unenforceability for inequitable 
conduct before the PTO will likely remain a large part of patent 
litigation for conduct that was not considered during the initial 
prosecution of the patent or during a Supplemental Proceeding. 
Rather than eliminating inequitable conduct charges during patent 
litigation, H.R. 1249 may increase proceedings before the PTO, while 
leaving charges of inequitable conduct in play in most major patent 
litigations. 
2. Prior Versions of Patent Reform, Which Might be 
Better Alternatives to the Current Law 
Prior to the passage of H.R. 1249, there were various versions of 
un-passed Patent Reform Legislation that addressed inequitable 
conduct. Some of the proposed reform was spurred by a National 
Academy of Science Report in 2004. As discussed below, some of the 
past versions of patent reform might have provided better alternatives 
to inequitable conduct reform than the current version of the law. 
3. The 2003 FTC Report and National Academy of 
Science 2004 Report 
In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences released a report 
(“NAS Report”) that addressed patent reform.140 The NAS Report 
                                                                                                                            
 136. Id. A third party may initiate the proceeding. Both ex-parte and inter-parte 
reexamination can currently be initiated by a third party but both are limited to consideration of 
validity of an issued patent in light of prior art in the form of patents and printed publications. 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, 311 (2002). 
 137. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 12. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 123. Prior to that, in 2003 the FTC 
issued a report addressing patent reform. Although the FTC report touches on the issue of 
inequitable conduct briefly, the report does not focus on that aspect of patent law nor make 
recommendations specific thereto. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
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recommended that all subjective components should be eliminated 
from patent litigation—or at least modified and their role in litigation 
reduced.
141
 The NAS Report identified “willful” infringement, “best 
mode” and “inequitable conduct” as subjective inquires that were 
specific areas of concern.
142
 The NAS Report observed that subjective 
state-of-mind factors increase the cost and decrease the predictability 
of patent infringement litigation.
143
 The NAS Report further noted 
that discovery on those subjective inquires is time-consuming, 
expensive, and ultimately, “a principal source of soaring litigation 
costs.”144 “The committee believes that significantly modifying or 
eliminating these rules would increase the predictability of patent 
dispute outcomes without substantially affecting the principles that 
these aspects of the enforcement system were meant to promote.”145 
The NAS Report also observed that since the creation of the 
inequitable conduct doctrine by the courts, other procedures had been 
adopted by Congress and the PTO to support the integrity of the 
patent system.
146
 Specifically, the NAS Report pointed to “third-
party- and USPTO-initiated re-examination on withheld prior art, 
publication of pending applications, and third-party access to pending 
prosecution papers and the ability to submit material information.”147 
The NAS Report concluded that: 
In view of its cost and limited deterrent value the committee 
recommends the elimination of the inequitable conduct doctrine or 
changes in its implementation. The latter might include ending the 
inference of intent from the materiality of the information that was 
withheld, de novo review by the Federal Circuit
148
 of district court 
                                                                                                                            
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 5, at 11 (2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf. (“Another modification discussed 
during the Hearings would extend the disclosure duty to an inventor’s co-employees. Some 
panelists opposed expanded search duties as adding to patent preparation costs, raising difficult 
enforcement problems, fueling frivolous inequitable conduct defenses, or not necessarily 
contributing additional useful disclosure.”). 
 141. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 7. 
 142. Id. at 7, 118-23. 
 143. Id. at 7. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 122-23. 
 147. Id. at 123. The NAS Report also proposes an “open review process” that would 
further contribute to the integrity of the system. Id. 
 148. The Federal Circuit purports to review inequitable conduct under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989). It is not clear that reviewing findings of 
inequitable conduct de novo would reduce the assertion of the defense and such a standard 
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findings of inequitable conduct, award of attorney’s fees to a 
prevailing patentee, or referral to the USPTO for re-examination 
and disciplinary action.
149
 
It seemed apparent that changes to the implementation of the 
inequitable conduct doctrine were needed. 
4. The Various Versions of Proposed Legislative Reform 
Following the FTC Report and NAS Report, beginning in 2005, 
patent reform legislation was proposed and introduced every year, 
until finally H.R. 1249 was passed into law in 2011.
150
 The various 
versions of proposed patent reform can generally be lumped into four 
categories. The first category, characterized by the 2006 and 2009
151
 
versions, failed to mention inequitable conduct; presumably intending 
to leave the doctrine in its current form under the common law.
152
 The 
second category, characterized by the 2007 version of patent reform, 
would have codified the common law doctrine of inequitable conduct, 
with some important changes.
153
 The third category, the 2005 and 
2008 versions, would have reduced the applicability of the inequitable 
conduct defense in litigation and would shift the responsibility more 
                                                                                                                            
would further reduce certainty and increase delay. Indeed, some have argued that the Federal 
Circuit should give deference to a district court’s claim construction rather than reviewing such 
de novo. See Lauren Maida, Note, Patent Claim Construction: It’s Not a Pure Matter of Law, So 
Why Isn’t the Federal Circuit Giving the District Courts the Deference They Deserve?, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1773, 1775, 1795-1801 (2009). 
 149. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 123. 
 150. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr2795ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr2795ih.pdf; Patent Reform 
Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
109s3818is/pdf/BILLS-109s3818is.pdf; Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. 
(2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1908ih/pdf/BILLS-
110hr1908ih.pdf; Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3600is/pdf/BILLS-110s3600is.pdf; Patent Reform 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr1260ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr1260ih.pdf; Patent Reform 
Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
111s515is/pdf/BILLS-111s515is.pdf; Patent Reform Act of 2011, S. 23, 112th Cong. (2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s23is/pdf/BILLS-112s23is.pdf. 
 151. There does not seem to be a partisan bias with respect to Patent Reform generally or 
specifically with respect to the issue of inequitable conduct. For example, the 2009 Senate 
version was a bipartisan effort by conservative Republican Senator Orin Hatch from Utah and 
Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy from Vermont. Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Senators 
Hatch, Leahy Introduce Patent Reform Act of 2009 (Mar. 3, 2009), available at 
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2009/3/senators-hatch-leahy-introduce-patent-reform-
act-of-2009--. 
 152. See S. 3818; H.R. 1260. 
 153. See H.R. 1908. 
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to the PTO to handle inequitable conduct allegations.
154
 The fourth 
category, the 2010 version and the eventually passed 2011 version, 
H.R. 1249 creates a “Supplemental Examination” proceeding before 
the PTO designed to cure conduct that could be considered 
inequitable after the issuance of the subject patent.
155
 Because of the 
uncertain current state of the law and potential need for further 
reform, each of the 2005, 2007, and 2008, versions is worth 
examining separately. 
a. The 2007 Version of Patent Reform 
The 2007 version of patent reform (“2007 Version”) codified 
substantial aspects of the common law inequitable conduct defense.
156
 
Section 328 of the 2007 Version leaves the burden of proving 
inequitable conduct by clear and convincing evidence on the 
challenging party.
157
 While the House
158
 and Senate
159
 versions varied 
in some respects, both substantially adopted the common law of 
inequitable conduct. The 2007 Version required demonstration of 
intent to deceive and precluded negligence or gross negligence as 
being a sufficient showing for inequitable conduct.
160
 With respect to 
materiality, it adopted the “prima facie case” standard.161 The 2007 
Version did not mention the “sliding scale” standard of the common 
law, instead simply requiring that both materiality and intent be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence.
162
 
While the substantive showing required for inequitable conduct 
under the 2007 Version essentially codified common law, the 
remedial component was more discretionary and flexible. It allowed a 
court, in balancing the equities, to impose a choice of three remedies: 
(1) denying equitable relief to the patent holder and limiting the 
remedy for infringement to a reasonable royalty; (2) holding the 
                                                                                                                            
 154. See S. 3600; H.R. 2795. 
 155. See S. 515; S. 23. 
 156. H.R. 1908 § 12 (amending § 282(c)). 
 157. Id. at § 6 (proposing § 328).  
 158. Democratic Congressman Howard Berman introduced the House Bill, H.R. 1908 on 
April 17, 2007. This bill passed the House by a vote of 222-175 with 37 not present or not 
voting. H.R. 1908. 
 159. Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Senate Bill, S. 1145 on April 18, 
2007. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s1145is/pdf/BILLS-110s1145is.pdf. 
 160. Id. at § 12 (proposing § 298(c)). 
 161. Id. at § 12 (proposing § 298(b)). 
 162. Id. at § 12 (proposing § 298(a)). 
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claims in suit unenforceable or only the claims in which the 
inequitable conduct occurred unenforceable; or (3) holding the patent 
unenforceable.
163
 
As discussed above, the application of the common law 
inequitable conduct defense is problematic because of the 
inconsistency of its application, in apparent exchange for discretion. 
While there may be advantages to discretion—the disadvantages in 
this circumstance outweigh the advantages. The lack of certainty put 
applicants and prosecuting attorneys in too difficult of a position by 
failing to provide notice—requiring them to guess, for example, 
which materiality standard will be employed in litigation. It is 
especially important to have a clearly defined standard of materiality 
in light of case law holding that citing too much art, or failing to cite 
sufficient art, could potentially lead to a finding of inequitable 
conduct.
164
 
Being an equitable doctrine, it is understandable that courts 
would want to retain discretion in application of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine.
165
 Paradoxically, under the common law there is 
little discretion regarding the imposition of a remedy upon a finding 
of inequitable conduct; at least all of the claims of the subject 
patent—and possibly claims of related patents—are rendered 
unenforceable.
166
 
The 2007 Version provided the benefit of certainty by clarifying 
the standard of materiality and omitting the uncertainty and analytical 
problems associated with the sliding scale, with respect to the 
substantive aspect of the inequitable conduct. However, it retained for 
the courts discretion and flexibility to “do equity” in the remedial 
component after a finding of inequitable conduct. Preferable to the 
current common law, that version provided notice and certainty of 
what was required of applicants and prosecuting attorneys, while 
retaining discretion in the form of the remedy imposed after such a 
finding is made.
167
 
                                                                                                                            
 163. See id. at §12 (proposing § 298(e)). 
 164. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 837 F. Supp. 
1444, 1477 (N.D. Ind. 1992), aff’d without opinion, 11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
511 U.S. 1128 (1994). 
 165. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). 
 166. See, e.g., Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1227-30 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989). 
 167. The 2007 Version also provides for the court to refer the matter to the PTO for 
disciplinary action should it be shown that a prosecuting attorney or patent agent was involved 
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b. The 2008 Version of Patent Reform 
The 2008 version of Patent Reform (“2008 Version”) set forth 
detailed procedures for the administration of the inequitable conduct 
doctrine that primarily shifted the burden of determining inequitable 
conduct from the courts to the PTO.
168 
Proposed section 298(a) of that 
version provides that “[e]xcept as provided under this section or 
section 299,
169
 a patent shall not be held invalid or unenforceable 
based upon misconduct before the Office.”170 Proposed section 
298(b)(1)(B) sets forth essentially a restrictive “but for” causation 
requirement for materiality providing that “information is material if 
it is not part of the record or cumulative to information in the record 
and either establishes that a patent claim is not patentable or refutes a 
position that the applicant or patent owner took in response to a 
rejection of the claim as unpatentable.”171 
The 2008 Version essentially deals with inequitable conduct 
through special reissue proceedings in the PTO.
172
 The 2008 Version 
provided a mechanism for a court to refer the matter to the PTO if 
inequitable conduct charges arose during litigation.
173
 It provided that, 
upon a motion by a party in litigation and a finding by the court that it 
is more likely than not that a person “knowingly and intentionally 
deceived the [PTO] by concealing material information or by 
submitting false material information in such matter or proceeding, 
the court shall order the patent to be made the subject of a reissue 
application under [35 U.S.C.] section 251.”174 The 2008 Version then 
set forth specific procedural guidelines for the special reissue 
proceeding and potential appeal to the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board.
175
 
                                                                                                                            
in inequitable conduct. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007) 
(amending 282(c)(5)). 
 168. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3600is/pdf/BILLS-110s3600is.pdf. 
 169. Id. § 11. Section 299 is discussed below and provides for civil sanctions for a 
showing of inequitable conduct, as determined in a proceeding before the PTO. 
 170. S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 298(a)). Proposed section 298(a) further clarifies that 
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to create a cause of action or a defense in a civil 
action.” Id. 
 171. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(1)(B)). See also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 
649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (generally adopting a “but for” causation 
requirement but leaving open an undefined exception for “egregious misconduct”). 
 172. S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 298(b)(1)(A)). 
 173. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(1)-(2)). 
 174. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(1)(A)). 
 175. Id. (proposing § 298(e)(5)(E)). 
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The contemplated special reissue proceeding would have been ex 
parte.
176
 Under the special reissue proceeding for inequitable conduct 
allegations, claims may have been substituted or omitted, but they 
could not be broadened—as claims may be under current 35 U.S.C. 
section 251,
177
 within two years of the grant of the patent.
178
 The 2008 
Version outlines procedural guidelines for the special reissue 
proceedings and it allowed for discovery including production of 
documents and depositions,
179
 as well as for an appeal from reissue 
proceeding.
180
 
The 2008 Version also provided for civil sanctions for 
misconduct of prosecuting attorneys, patent examiners and parties to 
an office proceeding, up to ten million dollars.
181
 
The 2008 Version had advantages over the common law with 
respect to reducing the distraction and cost generally associated with 
an assertion of inequitable conduct during litigation by shifting that 
burden to the PTO. However, shifting the burden to the PTO to 
determine inequitable conduct—through the use of reissue 
proceedings—raises additional concerns. 
Proposed section 298(b)(4) of the 2008 version provided that a 
court shall not stay the litigation proceedings after referral to the PTO 
for the inequitable conduct reissue proceedings unless: (1) the 
Director rejects at least one claim of the patent; (2) the allegations of 
infringement remain pending in the litigation for at least one of the 
rejected claims; and (3) the court determines that the interests of 
justice require a stay.
182
 Thus, the parties may spend an abundance of 
time and resources in litigation—only to have some or all of the 
relevant claims rejected by the PTO—and consequently rendering 
moot issues in litigation.
183
 
                                                                                                                            
 176. Id. (proposing § 298(e)(5)(A)). 
 177. Id. (proposing § 298(f)). Current law also allows for ex parte reexamination, which 
may be requested by anyone. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). The reexamination is limited to 
consideration of patents and printed publications not previously considered by the PTO, 
however. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). Inter partes reexamination is also available under current law 
but it is not commonly requested by third parties because it gives rise to collateral estoppel. 35 
U.S.C. § 315 (2006). 
 178. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006). Current section 251 requires that the error sought to be 
corrected by a reissue proceeding occur “without deceptive intention,” so it would not be 
available under current law to cure a charge of inequitable conduct. Id. 
 179. S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 299(c)). 
 180. Id. (proposing § 299(d)). 
 181. Id. (proposing § 299(b)(3)(C)). 
 182. Id. (proposing § 298(b)(4)). 
 183. Conversely, if a stay was the default rule after initiation of the inequitable conduct-
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 The idea of parallel proceedings also creates a concern about 
inconsistent results. A finder of fact in the litigation could determine 
that an asserted claim of a patent was not invalid and the PTO could 
still find that such claim was invalid in the reissue proceeding.
184
 The 
2008 Version was not clear regarding the consequences in such a 
case. Presumably, the PTO’s determination of patentability would 
trump that of the litigation fact finder, as the subject patent claim 
would not issue from the PTO, and there would in effect retroactively 
be no claim for the fact-finder to pass upon in the litigation.
185
 Under 
the 2008 Version it appears that an accused infringer would have been 
able to escape liability based on a finding of invalidity by convincing 
either the PTO or the finder of fact in the litigation that the relevant 
claims of the asserted patent were invalid.
186
 Thus, the reissue 
proceeding would have likely become a common-place part of most 
major patent litigation.
187
 
Another disadvantage of the 2008 Version is the PTO, which is 
already understaffed,
188
 would undoubtedly have to be expanded and 
further funded to take on the additional responsibility of conducting 
the reissue proceedings relating to a charge of inequitable conduct.
189
 
Ultimately, the 2008 Version does not appear to have been a 
good legislative reform choice with regard to inequitable conduct. 
                                                                                                                            
based reissue proceedings, an alleged infringer could most likely use the reissue proceedings as 
a stall tactic. It is becoming more common for alleged infringers to seek ex parte reexamination 
of asserted patents during litigation—most likely in part—for that same reason (it is at the 
discretion of the district court whether to issue a stay pending reexamination of an asserted 
patent in litigation). 
 184. See, e.g., Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C-08-4962-DLJ, 2009 WL 
799404, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2009) (identifying problem of inconsistent findings by the 
PTO and the court in different parallel proceeding context). 
 185. See S. 3600 § 11 (proposing § 298(e)(2) which provides that the reissue 
proceedings—unless substitute claims are filed—shall “address only whether original claims 
continue to be patentable after consideration of the additional information . . . .”). 
 186. No preference is stated for whether the special reissue would be before the same 
examiner who examined the original application, when possible. See id. However, considering 
the high turn-over rate of examiners it seems likely that the reissue proceeding would commonly 
be conducted before a different examiner than the original application, who would of course 
bring with him his own set of understandings, opinions, and bias, with respect to the 
patentability of the invention—irrespective of the new information to be considered. 
 187. As mentioned above, the 2008 Version would require a motion to refer the matter to 
the PTO but it only requires a preponderance of the evidence that material information was 
withheld during the original prosecution, see id. § 298(b)(1)(A), and based on the amount of 
resources spent during litigation compared to prosecution it is likely that an accused infringer 
could regularly be successful on such a motion. 
 188. See John DeQ. Briggs, Intellectual Property & Antitrust: Two Scorpions in a Bottle, 
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 65, 66 (2009). 
 189. See id. 
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c. The 2005 Version of Patent Reform 
The 2005 version of patent reform
190
 (“2005 Version”) would 
have reduced
191
 the applicability and role in litigation of common law 
inequitable conduct doctrine.
192
 Under the 2005 Version, as under the 
2008 Version, the PTO would have been primarily responsible for 
determining inequitable conduct
193
 (with the court retaining 
jurisdiction in limited circumstances, addressed below).
194
 The PTO 
would have had sole authority to administer sanctions for violations 
by prosecuting attorneys or patent agents registered to practice before 
the PTO.
195
 
The 2005 Version also provided for the creation of a special unit 
within the PTO to investigate allegations of inequitable conduct,
196
 
and provided for certain discovery to occur and for appeal to the 
Patent and Trademark Appeal Board.
197
 If inequitable conduct was 
found to have occurred in a proceeding before the PTO, the PTO 
                                                                                                                            
 190. Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr2795ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr2795ih.pdf. 
 191. The proposed revisions would have eliminated the common law inequitable conduct 
defense instead making it governed exclusively by the revised act. Id. § 5 (proposing § 136(a) 
which provides “Any allegation of any type of violation of the duty of candor and good faith 
under this subsection shall be governed exclusively by this chapter.”). 
 192. The proposed revisions provide that individuals associated with the filing of a patent 
application have a duty of candor and that duty is violated if: 
(1) the individual failed to disclose information or misrepresented information; 
(2) the information not disclosed was material or, in the case of a 
misrepresentation, the misrepresentation was material; 
(3) the individual had knowledge of the materiality of the information not 
disclosed or, in the case of a misrepresentation, of the misrepresentation and 
materiality of the misrepresentation; and 
(4) the individual had the intent to deceive or mislead. 
Id. (proposing § 136(b)). 
 193. Id. Proposed § 136(c)(1) provides: 
No court or Federal department or agency other than the Office, and no other 
Federal or State governmental entity, may investigate or make a determination or 
an adjudication with respect to an alleged violation of the duty of candor and 
good faith under subsection (a) or with respect to an alleged fraud, inequitable 
conduct, or other misconduct in any proceeding before the Office involving a 
patent or in connection with the filing or examination of an application for patent, 
except as expressly permitted in this section. 
Id. § 136(c)(1). 
 194. Id. Proposed § 136(a) would have imposed the duty of candor on “individuals 
associated with the filing and prosecution of an application for patent and on individuals 
assisting a patent owner in proceedings before the Office involving a patent.” Id. § 136(a). 
 195. Id. (proposing § 136(e)(1)). 
 196. Id. (proposing § 136(e)). 
 197. Id. (proposing §§ 136(e)(2), (4)). 
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could have issued a fine in an amount sufficient to deter future 
violations, not to exceed one million dollars or five million dollars for 
particularly egregious conduct, without affecting the enforceability of 
the patent.
198
 
The 2005 Version also imposed certain procedural requirements 
before unenforceability for inequitable conduct could be asserted in 
court.
199
 Unenforceability based on inequitable conduct could only be 
raised by motion.
200
 Before such a motion could be granted, one or 
more asserted claims would have to have been found invalid and 
judgment entered on those claims.
201
 The 2005 Version directed that 
the court may not grant the motion unless the PTO relied on one or 
more material misrepresentations that are attributable to the patent 
owner (and excluding conduct by patent agents or prosecuting 
attorneys), which caused one or more invalid claims of the subject 
patent to issue.
202
 
Under the 2005 Version, assertions of unenforceability because 
of inequitable conduct in litigation would have been reduced. By 
delaying the timing of an assertion of inequitable conduct and 
requiring at least one claim first be held invalid, some allegations of 
inequitable conduct would become moot because it would be 
unnecessary to find claims unenforceable if they are already invalid. 
Unenforceability would only be an issue in litigation where one or 
more claims were invalid but other claims of the subject patent were 
both infringed and not invalid.
203
 
5. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Various 
Unpassed Versions of Reform Relating to Inequitable 
Conduct 
The precise effects of the “Supplemental Examination” 
provisions, section 257 of United States Code, added by H.R. 1249 
remain unclear. Consequently, further legislative reform might be 
desirable. The following discusses the general advantages and 
                                                                                                                            
 198. Id. (proposing § 136(e)(6)). 
 199. Id. (proposing § 136(d)(2)). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. See also Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding that at least one claim of the patent at issue must be found to be 
invalid before unenforceability due to inequitable conduct could be found). 
 202. H.R. 2795 § 5 (proposing 136(d)(2)(D)). 
 203. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(noting that under the current system inequitable conduct is alleged in nearly every major 
litigation). 
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disadvantages of the various proposed versions of patent reform, 
including the current version, H.R. 1249. 
a. Courts Should Retain Responsibility for 
Administration of Unenforceability of an Issued 
Patent with the PTO Having Sanctioning 
Authority for Violations of the Duty of Candor 
The ultimate determination of unenforceability due to 
inequitable conduct should be left with the court, as set forth in the 
2007 Version, rather than shifted to the PTO, as in the 2005 and 2008 
versions, in order to avoid inconsistencies, delay, and other inherent 
problems caused by parallel proceedings.
204
 The current law, H.R. 
1249, passed in 2011 will probably increase proceedings before the 
PTO in the form of Supplemental Examination but would not 
dramatically decrease inequitable conduct during litigation because of 
the limitation that the Supplemental Examination only provides for a 
safe harbor if the supplemental examination request is completed 
before inequitable conduct is charged in litigation.
205
 
Practically speaking, a Plaintiff to a patent litigation suit might 
not be aware of or be able to anticipate what the Defendants might 
allege constitutes inequitable conduct. This creates an incentive for a 
Defendant to make allegations of inequitable conduct before 
obtaining all relevant factual information to prevent the Plaintiff from 
availing itself of the Supplemental Proceedings safe harbor 
provision.
206
 In reality, Plaintiffs, in major patent litigation, might 
seek Supplemental Examination as a prophylactic measure, 
unnecessarily increasing the burden on the PTO. 
If the doctrine of inequitable conduct continues, it makes sense 
to have the court rather than the PTO make the ultimate determination 
because the court has been presented with all relevant information, 
and because equity requires a determination based on all of the facts 
surrounding a case.
207
 
However, the PTO should continue to have sanctioning authority 
for violations of the duty of candor and in fact this investigative and 
                                                                                                                            
 204. See generally Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. C-08-4962-DLJ, 2009 WL 
799404, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2009) (identifying problem of inconsistent findings by the 
PTO and the court in different parallel proceeding context). 
 205. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12, 125 Stat. 
284, 325-27 (2011) (codified in 35 U.S.C. § 257). 
 206. See id. 
 207. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrehct, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946). 
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sanctioning authority could be expanded as provided for by the 2005 
and 2008 Versions.
208
 Potential monetary sanctions and disciplinary 
action against those licensed to practice before the PTO have the 
effect of providing incentives for compliance with rules but without 
the concerns for the disproportionate remedy that accompany the 
current form of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct in 
litigation.
209
 
b. Materiality and Intent Should be Specifically Set 
Forth and Defined 
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit has recently attempted to 
more clearly define materiality and intent requirements for a showing 
of inequitable conduct.
210
 Unfortunately, the Court, while providing 
general rules, has left gaping exceptions, such as an “egregious 
misconduct” exception to materiality, which threaten to swallow the 
rule.
211
 
Under the current version of Patent Reform H.R. 1249, 
inequitable conduct will most likely continue to be a major factor in 
patent litigation because allegations of misconduct will be alleged 
before a patent owner can request “Supplemental Examination” of the 
subject patent.
212
 
                                                                                                                            
 208. See Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11(a) (2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3600is/pdf/BILLS-110s3600is.pdf; H.R. 2795, 
109th Cong. § 5 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
109hr2795ih/pdf/BILLS-109hr2795ih.pdf. 
 209. See Nicole M. Murphy, Note, Inequitable-Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the Death 
Penalty for Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2274 (2009) (“Recent 
application of the doctrine has been likened to ‘imposing the death penalty for relatively minor 
acts of misconduct.’”) (citing Robert Pear, Candor at Heart of Debate over Patents in Congress: 
Should Firms Lose Rights Won by Misrepresentation?, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 30, 2008, at 
11)); Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is also inequitable to strike 
down an entire patent where the patentee only committed minor missteps or acted with minimal 
culpability or in good faith.”); Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 131 (2007) (statement of Jon W. Dudas, 
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office noting that uncertainty surrounding the inequitable-conduct doctrine creates the potential 
for “draconian penalties” for innocent omissions); Paul M. Janicke, Inequitable Conduct: Out of 
the Frying Pan?, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 7, 2008, 12:04 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/08/inequitable-con.html (“[C]redible-sounding 
explanations” for innocent omissions by applicants years after a patent filing and application 
“are not that easy to come by”). 
 210. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
 211. See id. 
 212. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 12, 125 Stat. 
13 JOHNSON (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2012  11:26 AM 
232 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 28 
If the inequitable conduct doctrine persists in patent litigation, 
the 2007 Version’s requirements of a specific articulation of 
materiality,
213
 and intent should be adopted. Such specificity provides 
consistency and notice of requirements for compliance by prosecuting 
attorneys, agents, and patentees in order to avoid the problems with a 
lack of notice and uncertainty present in the common law application 
of inequitable conduct, discussed above.
214
 Both intent and materiality 
should be required to be separately proven by clear and convincing 
evidence without regard to any sliding scale. As suggested by the 
NAS Report, no inference should be drawn with respect to intent to 
deceive based upon the degree of materiality.
215
 As addressed above, 
materiality and intent are separate inquiries. There is no compelling 
reason that a sliding scale should be used to diminish the requirement 
of intent, or that an inference of intent should be drawn based on the 
degree of materiality. 
c. Discretionary and Flexible Remedial Provisions 
Are Desirable to the Rigid Remedies in the 
Inequitable Conduct Context 
The remedial provisions of the 2007 Version of Patent Reform 
are favorable to a harsh rule because of the discretion it offers in the 
choice of remedy after a finding of inequitable conduct.
216
 For 
example, a court could decide to deny injunctive relief and require 
that a certain percent of the royalty is paid in trust to the PTO rather 
than to the patentee, where the court finds that although there was 
inequitable conduct, it did not affect the validity of the patent. This 
remedy would avoid a windfall to the infringer,
217
 while 
                                                                                                                            
284, 325-27 (2011) (codified in 35 U.S.C. § 257). 
 213. The 2007 Version adopts the “prima facie case” standard of materiality. See Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12(b) (2007), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr1908ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr1908ih.pdf. It makes sense 
to adopt the same standard of materiality for litigation that is used by the PTO—although the 
Federal Circuit has made clear that it is not bound by the PTO’s rule in that regard. See 
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293-94. Patentees and prosecuting attorneys should be in compliance 
with litigation standards if they comply with the PTO rules and its current standard of 
materiality. Ultimately, there may not be a real difference between the “reasonable examiner” 
and “prima facie case” standards of materiality. The precise definition of materiality in this 
regard is probably not as important as actually clearly adopting some workable definition in 
order to give notice to patentees and their agents of requirements for conduct before the PTO. 
 214. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 215. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 123. 
 216. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 12 (2007), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s1145is/pdf/BILLS-110s1145is.pdf. 
 217. There are other possible remedies that a court in equity may determine to be 
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compensating the public in two ways. First, it would allow 
competition by denying injunctive relief. Second, it would 
compensate the PTO and in effect the public for the lack of full 
disclosure during prosecution of the application, which violates the 
“bargain” the patentee makes with the public of full disclosure in 
exchange for a limited monopoly.
218
 
d. Attorneys’ Fees 
Finally, one issue that is not addressed by any of the patent 
reform legislation, but that was raised by the NAS Report is the award 
of attorneys’ fees.219 
The general reasoning behind the “American Rule”, where each 
party bears its own attorneys’ fees, is to prevent parties from being 
dissuaded from bringing or defending meritorious claims because of 
fear of being burdened with the opposing side’s attorneys’ fees,220 
should the opposing party ultimately prevail.
221
 Awarding attorneys’ 
fees to the prevailing party as a matter of right when inequitable 
conduct was asserted would probably not be desirable because of the 
likelihood of chilling meritorious assertions and defenses. However 
under 35 U.S.C. section 285, proof of inequitable conduct can form 
the basis for the award of attorneys’ fees in favor of the accused 
infringer if inequitable conduct makes the case exceptional.
222
 
Therefore, if an attorneys’ fees provision was added to reduce 
the frequency of inequitable conduct claims, in line with the NAS 
Report, it would be advisable to include an explicit provision stating 
that an unsuccessful assertion of inequitable conduct may make the 
case exceptional, allowing the patentee to recover its attorneys’ fees 
relating to an unsuccessful charge of inequitable conduct. However, a 
                                                                                                                            
appropriate after a finding of inequitable conduct. As another example, for minor violations, a 
court may decide to deny lost profits but allow a full reasonable royalty. 
 218. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system 
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure 
of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited 
period of time.”). 
 219. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 122. 
 220. Bregstone v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 507, 511 (1984). 
 221. Of course the high percentage of cases that are overturned on appeal suggests that 
reasonable minds can vary on the ultimate merits of a case and a case certainly could be brought 
in good faith but ultimately lost. For example, the Federal Circuit overturns roughly 40% of the 
claim construction cases it hears on appeal. See DONALD W. RUPERT, COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON CASE PREPARATION, SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES, AND 
BEST PRACTICES FOR CLIENT SUCCESS (2008), available at 2008 WL 5939923 at *24. 
 222. See Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 455 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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finding that an assertion of inequitable conduct may make the case 
exceptional should remain discretionary with the district court rather 
than adopted as a matter of right, in order to align with case law. 
If the procedural requirements of the 2005 Version were 
adopted, an attorneys’ fees provision would be unnecessary. 
Borderline assertions of inequitable conduct might be reduced by the 
requirement of a finding that at least one claim is invalid and the 
requirement that the district court grant a motion to allow an assertion 
of the inequitable conduct defense in litigation.
223
 
III. A PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
DEFENSE BASED ON VARYING THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY, 
DEPENDING UPON FULL DISCLOSURE 
Both Congress
224
 and the Federal Circuit have recently taken 
steps to reduce the role of inequitable conduct in patent litigation.
225
 
The ultimate effect of these changes remains unclear, as discussed 
above, but a better alternative would be to entirely eliminate the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct from patent litigation and replace it 
with an interpretation of 35 U.S.C. section 282 that the presumption 
of validity of an issued patent only arises when all material 
information was before the Examiner during prosecution of the issued 
patent.
226
 This makes sense because the validity presumption is based 
on the belief that governmental officials normally do their jobs but if 
the Examiner was lacking material information he or she would not 
be able to make an informed decision. That would also serve the 
current purpose of the inequitable conduct doctrine by giving 
incentive to provide all material information to the PTO to obtain the 
presumption of validity. 
The inequitable conduct defense arose as a result of a belief that 
it was necessary to ensure the duty of candor in patent prosecution, 
because of its nature as an ex parte proceeding.
227
 “When a patent has 
                                                                                                                            
 223. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (similarly holding that at least one claim must be invalidated by non-disclosed 
art before inequitable conduct may be asserted). 
 224. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in various sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 225. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292. 
 226. This section provides in pertinent part: “A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . The 
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting 
such invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 227. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (“Without doubt, candor and truthful cooperation are essential to an 
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been examined and duly granted, judicial review must give due 
weight to the presumption of validity. . . . The presumption of validity 
is based on the presumption of administrative correctness of actions 
of the agency charged with examination of patentability.”228 
Importantly, under existing Federal Circuit precedent,
229
 the 
“presentation at trial of additional evidence that was not before the 
PTO does not change the presumption of validity or the standard of 
proof, although the burden may be more or less easily carried because 
of the additional evidence.”230 Therefore, even if material information 
was not before the examiner during prosecution, the Federal Circuit 
has ruled that there is still a presumption of validity of an issued 
patent that must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence at 
trial to find the subject patent invalid.
231
 
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,
232
 the United States 
Supreme Court indicated that material information that was not before 
the examiner during prosecution of a patent could render the 
presumption of validity of an issued patent inapplicable, or at least 
                                                                                                                            
ex parte examination system. . . . The threat of inequitable conduct, with its ‘atomic bomb’ 
remedy of unenforceability, ensures that candor and truthfulness.”). 
 228. Applied Materials v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 229. Prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit, case law had held that when there was art 
that was “closer to” the subject of the application that was introduced during litigation but was 
not before the examiner the presumption of validity did not apply and the burden of proof for 
showing validity rested with the patentee. See Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 
(9th Cir. 1980); accord Photo Elecs. Corp. v. England, 581 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1978); Deere 
& Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 513 F.2d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Tel-
Design Inc., 460 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir. 1972). Of course whether a reference is “closer to” the 
invention than art that was before the examiner does not necessarily coincide with whether the 
art is material but it does recognize that the presumption of validity should be affected when the 
examiner was not aware of certain information. See Tveter, 633 F.2d at 833. However, in Am. 
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), the Federal Circuit 
specifically stated that it disagreed with that precedent and that the presumption of validity 
attached to an issued patent could only be overcome by a showing of invalidity by clear and 
convincing evidence, regardless of what information the examiner might have been lacking 
when making a determination of patentability. Id. at 1359-60. 
 230. Applied Materials, 98 F.3d at 1569. 
 231. See id. There was a pre-Federal Circuit split among the circuits regarding the required 
burden to overcome the presumption of validity of an issued patent with at least the Second 
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit holding that only a preponderance of evidence was necessary. 
Compare Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294 (6th Cir. 1975) (recognizing circuit split 
and that some circuits required clear and convincing evidence), with Rains v. Niaqua, Inc., 406 
F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1969) (“a preponderance of the evidence determines the issue”), and 
Lorenz v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 305 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1962) (indicating that a 
preponderance of the evidence was sufficient). See also supra note 229 regarding the Ninth 
Circuit’s varying burden depending upon what art was before the examiner. 
 232. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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severely lowers the burden of overcoming the presumption.
233
 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead, section 282 of the Patent Act234 
should be interpreted so the presumption of validity depends upon 
whether all non-cumulative material information was before the 
examiner of the application resulting in the subject patent. If the 
current requirement, that the presumption of validity must be 
overcome by clear and convincing evidence, was seen as being 
insufficient incentive for the patentee to provide all non-cumulative 
material information to the examiner, the presumption could be raised 
to require the accused infringer to show that the PTO’s decision to 
grant the patent was arbitrary,
235
 or that the PTO’s decision to grant 
the patent is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
If non-cumulative material information was not before the 
Examiner, one option would be to have the burden remain on the 
challenging party to show invalidity by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence. Alternatively, the burden could shift to the patentee
236
 to 
show validity of the patent by a preponderance of the evidence if the 
non-cumulative material information was not before the examiner 
during litigation.
237
 
                                                                                                                            
 233. See id. at 426. 
 234. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 235. This standard would treat the PTO’s decision to grant the patent as an administrative 
decision subject only to review under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard 
afforded administrative agencies, based upon the rationale that the agency is experienced in 
dealing with its particular subject matter. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). When all non-cumulative material information is before the 
examiner it might make sense to use such a highly deferential standard during litigation in 
deference to the examiner’s expertise in the field. 
 236. Applied Materials v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563, 
1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Tveter v. AB Turn-O-Matic, 633 F.2d 831, 833 (9th Cir. 1980) (pre-
Federal Circuit case law shifting the burden to the patentee to prove validity when “closer” art 
was not before the examiner). 
 237. It would be a difficult judicial interpretation for a court to adopt a standard whereby 
the patentee had the burden of proving validity where material information was not before the 
examiner under the current version of section 282 which provides in part that “[t]he burden of 
establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such 
invalidity.” 35 U.S.C. § 282. That change would probably have to come from Congress. 
Conversely, a differing standard, such as where a challenger during litigation bore the burden of 
proving invalidity of an issued patent by a preponderance of the evidence if non-cumulative 
material information was not before the examiner, instead bore the burden of proving invalidity 
by a higher standard such as: (1) demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the patent 
should not have issued; (2) that there is no substantial evidence to support the issuance of the 
patent; or (3) an appropriate court (the United States Supreme Court or the Federal Circuit en 
banc) could rule that the decision to grant the patent was arbitrary and capricious without 
legislative intervention because section 282 does not set forth an appropriate burden of proof for 
a challenge to the validity of an issued patent. 
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Regardless of which standard of proof is ultimately required, the 
key would be to provide a sufficiently higher burden on the party 
challenging validity during litigation to provide adequate incentive to 
the patentee to disclose all non-cumulative material during 
prosecution of the application. Indeed, the patentee would have more 
incentive to provide material information to the examiner under the 
proposed system,
238
 as under the current system neither the patentee 
nor the attorney representing him has an obligation to search for 
material prior art.
239
 
In addition to providing the desired incentive to patentees to 
disclose all non-cumulative material information, this varying burden 
would also make sense logically because the examiner is more likely 
to make the correct decision on patentability when she is in 
possession of all material information. The precise burdens adopted 
would then depend upon policy considerations regarding whether 
more or less patents should ultimately be found invalid during 
litigation,
240
 taking into account relevant desired societal incentives 
for encouragement of innovation and the necessary burdens related 
thereto. 
Considering the positive effect on innovation that a strong patent 
system provides, adopting the agency’s deferential standard of 
                                                                                                                            
 238. Admittedly the severity of the result of not disclosing material information would not 
be as great as in the current system. However, especially with respect to patent applications that 
are likely to be litigated the incentive to receive the benefit of the presumption would likely be 
sufficient, especially in conjunction with the threat of sanctions from the PTO for 
noncompliance with disclosure obligations, to ensure disclosure of non-cumulative material 
information. See 37 C.F.R. pt. 10, 11 (2010). 
 239. See Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(citing Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“The mere possibility that material information may exist will not suffice to give rise to a duty 
to inquire; sufficient information must be presented to the attorney to suggest the existence of 
specific information[,] the materiality of which may be ascertained with reasonable inquiry.”)); 
id. (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“Nor does an applicant for patent, who has no duty to conduct a prior art search, have an 
obligation to disclose any art of which, in the [district] court’s words, he ‘reasonably should be 
aware.’”)). 
 240. This determination concerns an entirely separate issue of the policy of the desired 
relative strength of patent protection and the effects thereof, which has been analyzed and 
disputed at length by economists and legal scholars. See generally Shawn G. Hansen, 
Perspectives on U.S. Patent Reform: The Next Steps are Crucial, in UNDERSTANDING PATENT 
REFORM IMPLICATIONS: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEFINING KEY ISSUES, INTERPRETING 
CURRENT PROPOSED LEGISLATION, AND PROJECTING FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 141, 141-74 
(2009); see also Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
863 (2007). The relative ease or difficulty of proving invalidity of an issued patent is one of the 
most effective ways to alter the relative strength of the patent system, based on determined 
desired incentives and burdens. 
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requiring the challenging party to prove that the PTO’s decision to 
grant the patent was arbitrary and capricious, or was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence if all non-cumulative material 
information was before the examiner, and requiring the challenging 
party to prove the patent is invalid by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence if non-cumulative material information was not before the 
examiner would probably be the best choice. This would provide 
sufficient incentive for the patentee to provide all material 
information to the PTO while protecting the integrity of the patent 
system.
241
 That change in the law,
242
 if adopted, would make the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct unnecessary. 
Under the proposed new system, instead of the “atomic bomb” 
inequitable conduct presents,
243
 the patentee would be provided with 
an incentive to disclose all non-cumulative material art to the 
examiner during prosecution of an application in order to obtain a 
favorable burden of proof regarding validity during litigation of the 
subject patent.
244
 during prosecution of an application in order to 
                                                                                                                            
 241. If these burdens were adopted, that may not result in a substantially different number 
of patents being held valid and enforceable than under the current system because the current 
burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence, applied to all issued patents, falls somewhere 
between the two proposed alternative burdens of proof. Moreover, the defense of inequitable 
conduct is rarely successful so its elimination would not likely dramatically affect the number of 
successful infringement actions. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 
1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 242. The Federal Circuit has ruled that while the clear and convincing evidence standard 
burden of proof never changes even when material information was not before the examiner, in 
such a case, additional deference to the PTO’s decision is reduced or eliminated. See, e.g.,  
Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
When an attacker simply goes over the same ground traveled by the PTO, part of 
the burden is to show that the PTO was wrong in its decision to grant the patent. 
When new evidence touching validity of the patent not considered by the PTO is 
relied on, the tribunal considering it is not faced with having to disagree with the 
PTO or with deferring to its judgment or with taking its expertise into account. 
The evidence may, therefore, carry more weight and go further toward sustaining 
the attacker’s unchanging burden.  
Id. The effect, if any, of this is unclear but it may not be a great enough incentive in itself to 
cause patentees to seek out and disclose all material information to the examiner absent the 
threat of inequitable conduct. 
 243. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 244. Professor Mark Lemley has asserted that because the vast majority of patents never 
get litigated, it is better that the PTO does not spend an abundance of time and resources 
evaluating each application in what he calls “rational ignorance.” See Mark A. Lemley, Rational 
Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001). The proposed burden 
shifting would facilitate that goal in the sense that patentees who know that the patent is likely to 
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obtain a favorable burden of proof regarding validity during litigation 
of the subject patent. 
Of course this change would mean that the issue of whether non-
cumulative material prior art was not before the examiner would have 
to be determined in litigation when the validity of the patent is 
challenged in order to determine the appropriate burden on the issue 
of validity.
245
 However, the issue of whether non-cumulative material 
prior art was before the examiner is currently an issue in nearly every 
major patent litigation as an element of an inequitable conduct 
charge.
246
 At a minimum, the proposed new system would eliminate 
the troublesome intent element of inequitable conduct, along with the 
prejudice, burden, expense, unpredictability, and distraction 
accompanied by an inequitable conduct allegation allowed for under 
the current system. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The strength of the presumption of validity of an issued patent 
should depend on whether the Examiner who reviewed the 
application was in possession of all non-cumulative material 
information.
247
 In addition the inequitable conduct doctrine should be 
eliminated as a defense in patent litigation because it would no longer 
be a necessary incentive for the patentee to present all material 
information to the Examiner during prosecution of a patent. The 
incentive for full disclosure would come from the desire to receive a 
favorable burden of proof relating to a challenge of the validity of the 
issued patent during litigation. 
 
                                                                                                                            
never be litigated would probably not spend an abundance of resources searching out prior art 
and overburdening the PTO with an abundance of references. Id. However, where a patent is 
likely to be litigated the patentee would have incentive to seek out and submit all references, 
allowing the PTO to spend most often its time examining patent applications that are likely to be 
litigated. Id. 
 245. Because it would continue to be relevant, the definition of “materiality” should be 
clarified and a single standard adopted so that patentees, litigants and prosecuting attorneys are 
aware of what is required of them during prosecution of a patent application. 
 246. The determination of whether all non-cumulative information was before the 
examiner might properly be determined by the court as a matter of law, possibly in conjunction 
with a Markman proceeding. Claim construction bears on the issue of materiality and a 
materiality determination would naturally follow from a Markman proceeding. 
 247. The growth of the inequitable conduct doctrine (and the arguable need therefore) 
coincided with the change in case law that held that the presumption of validity, which must be 
overcome by clear and convincing evidence, attached regardless of what information was not 
before the examiner. See supra note 231. 
